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POLITICAL CHANGE IN CUBA: 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXODUS 
Rightly or wrongly, any focus on the political situation in Cuba in 1995 
inevitably starts with the extraordinary events of July and August 1994. For 
a few weeks, the world watched on television as thousands upon thousands 
of Cubans apparently risked their lives, on all manner of makeshift craft, 
crossing shark-infested and stormy seas, to escape the tyranny and starvation 
of a political system allegedly on the brink of collapse.1 Moreover, for those 
following the news from Havana, this was no sudden incident, but the 
culmination of months of growing discontent, expressed through embassy 
occupations, boat hijackings, street violence and the deaths of escapers and 
policemen alike. To all intents and purposes, it seemed that the collapse, 
which many observers had expected in 1989 and then again in 1991, had 
finally come.2 
What happened to that crisis and that exodus? And what happened to that 
collapse? For even more suddenly than the crisis emerged, it disappeared 
from the media headlines with the relatively low-key signing of the United 
States-Cuban immigration agreement of 8 September 1994. An episode which 
had occupied the media's attention so dramatically, and which seemed to 
augur deep systemic change in an apparently anomalous political system, 
simply faded away, with little further outside interest in its outcome. 
Whatever this might say about media priorities, the outcome must raise two 
basic questions. Firstly, if the episode did indeed end so suddenly without the 
expected explosion and collapse, how deep a crisis was it in the first place? 
Indeed, whose crisis was it, Cuba's or the USA's? Secondly, after the event, 
what conclusions can we actually draw about the system itself? What can the 
whole drama usefully tell us about the wider crisis and the survival of the 
Cuban Revolution? 
It can be argued that the whole episode was of little direct relevance to the 
system and was certainly not the deep crisis it seemed. We only have to 
consider who the balseros were, at least in their majority. For, bearing in 
mind that it is still far too early for any detailed, informed, research-based 
analysis of the phenomenon,3 we can nonetheless draw a few tentative 
conclusions from the little that has emerged. 
Clearly, with so many refugees, the exodus obviously included a wide 
range of individuals and motives; however, early indications seem to point 
to the most identifiable group amongst the balseros as being young Havanans 
with access to some financial resources.4 This is borne out, perhaps, by two 
apparent effects of the exodus: the fall in the number of black-market money-
changers on the Havana streets and the fall in petty crime rates in certain 
Havana barrios. It seems possible, therefore, that at least a significant section 
of the refugee population came from those groups already somewhat marginal 
to the Havana political, social and economic system - i.e. those already 
predisposed to dissent or depart, perhaps incited by the effects of the May 
1994 economic measures which sought deliberately to curtail the relatively 
unrestrained activities of an increasingly resented, but lucrative, black 
market.5 
Further proof of the 'minimalist' perspective comes from the Cuban 
government's remarkably tolerant attitude throughout the crisis, permitting 
and even encouraging it by leadership speeches and police inactivity. If true, 
the reasons are relatively easy to identify: the continuing usefulness of 
emigration as a safety valve for a discontented or exhausted population; the 
possibility of purging politically dangerous marginal groups; and the 
attractive possibility of embarassing the United States. If any or all of these 
perspectives have any validity, then the 'crisis' of July-August 1994 must be 
seen in retrospect as more of a crisis at government-to-government level than 
as a deep systemic trauma. 
What, then, of the alternative perspective - namely that the whole crisis 
might have a wider and deeper relevance? The first point to make in this 
respect is that the exodus must necessarily be seen (regardless of the high 
number of marginados who might or might not have been included in the 
refugees) as a reflection of the underlying tensions of a system under serious 
internal and external pressure since at least 1989 - above all of the tensions 
between a young population increasingly at odds with the older generation's 
prolonged hold on power, together with the perceived staleness of the 
system's values and with the frustration of their expectations. In that sense, 
the episode represented a collective protest against and escape from the daily 
grind of existence in the Cuba of 1994 - against the hardship, boredom and 
loss of hope, against the pressures created by rising petty crime and a 
burgeoning black economy into which even the most loyal citizens are 
obliged to descend in order to survive. 
Its wider relevance, however, is in the context of US-Cuban relations. For 
the crisis seems to have started a process of change, in which those relations 
are already being totally reshaped and in which Washington's policy -
increasingly one of the central factors in Cuba's predicament and future - is 
also being redirected and revised. Behind this perspective lies the reality that, 
since 1962 (the Cuban missile crisis), the United States' policy of quarantine 
and siege has actually exercised little direct effect on events within Cuba; 
instead it became an ossified pillar of the world system which shaped the 
context for the Revolution's survival, leading in particular to dependence on 
the Soviet bloc and to a permanently high level of nationalist alert. 
How then did, or might, the exodus reshape Washington's perspective on 
Cuba? In the first place, it pushed Cuba further up the active agenda. For, 
since 1962, Cuba has been on the 'back burner' of policy concerns, brought 
to the front only to respond to periodic domestic political pressures or in 
single moments of crisis (such as the Mariel exodus in 1980). In such cases, 
the resulting 'Cuba policy' has tended to mean a restatement of rhetoric with 
little real action; the establishment of Radio Marti and TV Marti in the mid-
19808 and even the Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) of 19926 can be seen in this 
light. The reason is that Cuba has been relatively unimportant for 
Washington's foreign policy, controlled by the coexisting superpower and 
safely isolated, vis a vis the region, in the category of 'East-West problems'. 
The result has been a policy stagnation, with the contours and realisation of 
that policy being shaped by the strength of exile groups and the variable 
effects of the economic embargo. 
With the election of President Clinton in 1992, there were early signs of a 
shift in attitudes. On the Cuban side, there was evident relief at an event 
which seemed to offer some prospect of reprieve and which certainly was of 
symbolic importance, since a Bush re-election would have constituted a 
serious blow to the morale and the future of the Cuban system, indicating a 
continuation of the hostility. Havana therefore responded with several broad 
hints of a willingness to shift policy (with possible arms reductions and 
compensation for expropriated property), and, most intriguingly, with 
Castro's public offer to stand down in exchange for the lifting of the 
embargo. 
Superficially, US policy did not, however, change at all; the CDA was 
confirmed by the incoming administration and an early speech to the exile 
lobby (the CANF)7 by Alex Watson, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, confirmed the embargo as immovable until 
democratic change should come in Cuba. However, beneath the surface, 
significant shifts were discernible. The most immediate were the haggling 
over the selection of Watson,8 and the nomination as Ambassador to the 
Organisation of American States of Harriet Babbit, the wife of the openly 
pro-dialogue Bruce Babbitt. The messages to both Havana and Miami seemed 
clear. 
Equally, a number of other moves were made which could be seen as a 
deliberate easing of the tensions: suspension of the funding of TV Marti in 
July 1993; the increases in permissions to US citizens to visit Cuba; the 
compromise of paying Havana the Cuban share on telephone cable profits; 
discussions of new immigration, deportation and hijacking agreements (with 
cooperation on the latter, and on drug offenders, being quietly increased). 
Small straws in the wind these may have been, but in the context of past 
relations, in an area of foreign policy where previously any shift would have 
been unthinkable and politically impossible, they suggested a change in the 
relationship. 
By summer 1994, therefore, the anomalous Cuba policy was already being 
undermined and was ripe for updating, if not total revision. In the event, of 
course, the policy shifts that did come about were only provoked by the fact 
that the exodus presented a crisis to the United States rather than to Cuba: the 
pressures on Florida of thousands of refugees seeking asylum, housing, jobs 
and food was indeed a crisis (echoing previous fears of the direct effects on 
Florida of a flood of Haitian immigrants if the Haiti problem was not solved), 
and an outbreak of unrest in Cuba could easily have had, and could still have, 
a seriously destabilising effect on the whole Caribbean region. The Clinton 
administration therefore had to act, which it did in two ways. 
First came the standard rhetoric (but this time, in the post-Cold War era, 
with greater immediate effect in Cuba): the embargo was again tightened, 
flights from Miami were restricted, cash remittances from emigre Cubans 
were cut back and media broadcasts were increased. Nothing, it seemed, had 
changed. 
Alongside this old pattern, however, emerged a new one, the effective 
reopening of political and academic debate on the whole Cuba policy. For a 
start, the US government took a step of fundamental symbolic significance, 
ending the special status of Cuban political refugees, who had hitherto been 
able to enjoy immediate acceptance on the mainland if they escaped illegally 
(while, contradictorily, would-be legal migrants were obliged to wait 
interminably and found obstacles continually put in their path, by Washington 
rather than Havana). Now, in a severe blow to the CANF, Cuban refugees 
were to be treated no differently from other illegal migrants; in one fell 
swoop, a major part of the traditional policy, three decades old, had been 
swept away. 
More significantly, however, there were clear signs that, although denials 
have poured forth from Washington, the immigration agreement in September 
19949 was likely to be followed by secret discussions on the wider issues of 
relations between the two countries, not least on the embargo itself. Given 
that the Cuban government at least partly allowed the refugee crisis to 
develop, it must be concluded that in these secret discussions Washington's 
hand has been forced by Havana. 
These policy shifts reflect a recognition by the Clinton administration, and 
Washington policymakers, of a number of realities. First, that there had 
already long been a growing lobby within the United States to end the 
outdated policy on Cuba and lift the embargo. Business groups (including 
many Florida-based emigre entrepreneurs) have been pressing for an opening 
to a market starved of consumer goods and flooded with surplus pesos. 
Democratic politicians, before the November Congressional election shake-
up, have been arguing openly for a change (including the then two Chairs of 
the Congressional Foreign Relations Committees), while even certain right-
wing political advisors have argued that the lifting of the blockade would 
accelerate the fall of the Cuban system. 
This latter point was related to a second recognition by the administration, 
namely that the embargo was increasingly the direct cause of the hardship in 
Cuba which had produced the exodus. 
Thirdly, domestic political considerations led many policy advisors to 
perceive that the traditionally united and strong emigre lobby was now 
weaker, divided by generations and by arguments as to the effects of the 
hardship and the newly imposed restrictions on the relatives of emigre 
families. Lastly, there was something of a recognition that there were indeed 
signs in Cuba of an impulse towards and willingness to consider political 
reform, and that perhaps moves to acknowledge this might hasten such shifts. 
The recent success in Haiti of a Clinton administration seeking policy 
victories seemed to argue for mediation. 
What, then, were these signs of an internal movement for reform? To 
understand this, and the significance of such shifts, we should first place the 
issue within a clear context - the need to understand the particular 
conjuncture in Cuba of deep economic crisis and deep, thoroughgoing 
economic change, all within a unique system best understood apart from other 
paradigms of regime transition. For the original Cuban 'model', and its post-
1989 manifestation, must necessarily be seen as atypical - a point which 
needs to be emphasised precisely because much of the recent media 
treatment, and not a little of the academic debate, has inevitably tended to be 
phrased within one of two paradigms, neither of which is particularly helpful 
to such analysis. 
The first is the framework created by the collapse of the various Eastern 
European Communist systems from 1989, in which Cuba's crisis has been 
typically presented as the next, or last, domino in the chain; the second is the 
debate among Latin Americanists about the nature of the post-1980 
experience of democratisation, in which context the Cuban case has tended 
to be seen as the next, inevitable, regime to fall. While both perspectives 
certainly do have something to offer, they also tend to mislead and to pose 
perhaps inappropriate questions. For the reality is that the Cuban political 
system since 1959 has been best understood within its own specific historical 
context. It is as unhelpful today to judge the Revolution as some sort of 
Caribbean version of Eastern Europe as it has always been, whatever the 
obvious similarities with the collapsed Bloc; equally, previous comparisons 
with Latin American political phenomena, while probably more accurate and 
useful than any Eastern European comparisons, have tended to miss the 
factors unique to the island's experience. 
What, then, is the reality of Cuba in 1994? At one level, it is simple: that 
the system is currently, and has been for at least four years, in the throes of 
a crisis so deep that it still seriously threatens the basis and the survival of a 
political system which is now in its thirty-sixth year of existence. That this 
is the Revolution's deepest crisis is beyond question, and many have no doubt 
that it is also terminal. Yet already we are faced with two significant 
differences from the two paradigms mentioned above: first, no Latin 
American economy has, in recent years, experienced a downturn of such 
dramatic scale in such a short time as has the Cuban economy; secondly, that 
crisis has already continued, and deepened, for five years without the system 
collapsing in the face of popular pressure, as was patently the case in post-
1989 Eastern Europe. 
That brings us immediately to the causes of the crisis itself. Most 
obviously, the immediate cause was the precipitate collapse of the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) from 1989 onwards and of the 
Soviet Union from 1991; given the increased dependence of Cuban trade on 
that trading bloc (which, between 1959 and 1989 accounted for about 75% of 
Cuba's foreign trade), the immediate and predictable effect on the Cuban 
economy was disastrous. To that, of course, should be added the tightening 
of the US embargo since the late 1980s. Until 1991, that embargo had been 
a costly irritant,10 inflating costs, perpetuating inefficiencies and cementing 
the dependence on the USSR; from 1991, however, it became the 
fundamental, or at least the most critical, problem, strangling the economy's 
attempts to revive. This fact is understandable when one considers the 
extraordinary breadth of the embargo.11 
These immediate causes, therefore, have conspired to make the underlying 
Cuban crisis both exceptionally traumatic and unique in either a 'Communist' 
or a Latin American context. A glance at some of the figures makes that all 
too clear. Economic growth, for example, went from zero between 1985 and 
1989 to -4% in 1990, -25% in 1991, -15% in 1992, recovering slightly in 
1993 to -10% (the latter figure aggravated by the heavy losses sustained 
during the tropical storm of March 1993). Between 1989 and 1992, imports 
from Comecon (accounting for 84% of the total in 1989) fell by some 90%, 
with oil supplies from the USSR falling from 13.3 million tonnes (mt) to 1.8 
mt, fertiliser from 1.3 mt to 0.25 mt and animal feed from 1.6 mt to 0.45 mt; 
simultaneously, the prices of imported oil and food rose by up to 40%, while 
sugar and nickel export prices fell by 20% and 28% respectively. There 
followed two disastrous sugar harvests in 1993 and 1994 of only 4.3 mt and 
3.8 mt (following a respectable 1991 harvest of 8.4 mt and a decline in 1992 
to 6.2 mt), leading to a further fall in export earnings (of some $500 million) 
and the suspension of recently agreed contracts. The consequences have been 
the collapse of economic activity within Cuba, inflationary pressures, rapidly 
growing shortages and, overall, the picture of a partly oxen-driven 
agriculture, a bicycle-based transport system, regular power-cuts, severe 
underemployment, plummeting living standards and falling levels of 
nourishment - as witnessed in the 1994 neuritis epidemic.12 
Obviously, such a collapse cannot fail to have had a deep impact on the 
stability and legitimacy of the political system. However, while opinions 
differ as to whether the point of total economic collapse is actually past or 
not, or is about to come, most agree that the economic direction chosen by 
the Cuban leadership is already clear, a fact which must equally affect the 
nature and the functioning of that political system. 
Since 1986, the Cuban economic system has undergone a fundamental 
transformation, a real 'revolution', moving with astonishing rapidity from an 
inefficient, centrally-planned sugar-dominated system, largely dependent on 
barter trade with the Eastern bloc, to an economy that is increasingly open, 
and whose external trading enterprises are increasingly autonomous. Indeed, 
the economy is moving away from sugar towards tourism as the main 
currency earner, with increasing deregulation both externally and internally. 
Meanwhile, the informal economy (undeniably surpassing in efficiency and 
scope the stagnant and now contracting state sector) is being rapidly 
legalised. What we are seeing, in short, is the conversion of an economy 
following (for three decades) a supposedly 'socialist' model of development 
into a somewhat classical model of underdevelopment, in which the clear 
direction is towards some version of capitalism.13 
So far, most observers would agree that this economic change has not yet 
been visibly accompanied by a commensurate process of radical political 
transformation. This disjuncture between deep economic change and an 
unchanging polity has naturally given rise to both dire predictions of 
imminent political collapse and attempts to apply to the Cuban case criteria 
developed in the wider Latin American processes of democratisation, many 
of which were, of course, stimulated by conflicts between economic crisis 
and political tensions. Why then has a political revolution not taken place? 
The main explanation has to be that, until recently, there has not been a 
commensurate political crisis. In 1989, such crisis as there was could be seen 
as purely economic in character. However, the potential always existed for 
this to be translated into a parallel political crisis, if economic solutions were 
not found readily, and especially at the grass-roots level. Here, the key 
questions were not whether such a 'translation' could take place but when it 
might, and how long could the crisis go on until the cracks began to show in 
the edifice, how long before the underlying tensions and problems came 
closer to the surface. Could economic adjustment and progress come fast 
enough and be convincing enough? In the light of this, one should logically 
ask how the system has been able to survive so far, when far less afflicted 
systems collapsed throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
A starting point for possible explanations should be the wider process of 
democratisation in Latin America. For recent analyses of that process in 
some of the countries, where it has taken only shallow roots, have rightly 
focused on the issue of 'democratic contestation', the common experience of 
democratisation without citizenship. The issue here is that, in Cuba, recent 
change may be the reverse, i.e. citizenship without democratisation. 
An explanation for this must start with the basic reality of Cuba since the 
earliest days of the Revolution, namely that the system has long stressed and 
practised a clearly participatory ethos, albeit one somewhat flawed and 
continually conflicting with other pressures, not least the vanguardism of the 
revolutionary leadership and the idea and practice of the Party itself. This 
ethos was, of course, especially relevant and palpable in the 1960s in the 
absence (at least until 1965), of an omnipresent and powerful national 
Party14 and in the forced egalitarianism of rationing, the 'siege' and social 
revolution; in the more staid 1970s, that ethos was both enhanced (by more 
formal structures) and slowed, in the face of the more consumerist orientation 
of the process. 
Another basic truth is that the Revolution's legitimacy has long been built 
on the extensive improvements to, and guarantees of, social provision, for 
most Cubans; the benefits of healthcare and education are certainly 
fundamental to the average Cuban's appreciation of the strengths of the 
system, and, until recently, the guarantees of full employment and a crime-
free environment have fortified that perception. Thus, issues of 
'democratisation' were often shelved provided that the benefits of 
'citizenship' continued to be guaranteed. 
Other factors militating against the emergence of any expected political 
crisis must include the existence of safety valves within the system. The first, 
and most obvious, is the long-standing toleration of emigration, the much-
used (albeit expensive) valve adopted in the stressful 1960s. This 
phenomenon may detract from the system's legitimacy (externally and 
internally), and may even increase domestic discontent, but it has long 
proven its political worth - siphoning off both potential dissidence and 
potential unemployment - and must still offer some relief. 
Furthermore, relief has often been provided by periods in which debate in 
the various mass organisations and academic circles has been encouraged, 
usually at times of crisis (1962-5, 1972-6, 1989-1990) and always restoring 
a degree of legitimacy to a beleaguered system. 
By the late 1980s, however, the relative security of the political system had 
been undermined by three developments. First, it was undermined by the 
growing disjuncture between the social and political aspirations of younger 
generations and the economy's limited capacity to satisfy these demands, 
especially after 1984. Secondly, it was weakened by the discernible rise of 
an unprecedented, increasingly entrenched, power elite (beyond the guerrilla 
group), in the form of the Party, leading indeed to the growth of privilege 
and even corruption which saw their dramatic denouement in the Ochoa affair 
of 1989 - although there clearly may have been other factors contributing to 
that crisis.15 
The third factor was the surfacing of the various interlocking tensions that, 
perhaps inevitably, underlay the process of revolutionary change, tensions 
partly postponed and partly hidden by the scale, speed and depth of the 
changes and the imperatives of national unity, but also now aggravated by the 
pace and scope of the economic transformation under way since the early 
1980s. These tensions were sometimes obvious, sometimes subtle, but always 
with serious long-term implications: between fidelismo (meaning, especially, 
the position of Fidel Castro as the pivotal figure in decision-making) and the 
growing institutionalism of the power structure; between the guerrilla 
generation and ethos and, variously, the 'technocrats' of the Soviet-oriented 
1970s, the more Soviet-inclined ex-Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) 
politicians within the elite, and the newer generation aspiring to power; 
between the essentially closed system inherited from both the guerrilla 
experience and the 'siege' years and the social pressures for greater access 
to decision-making; between 'participation' and 'partyism'; between the need 
for a system based on mobilisation and the need for 'stability'; between the 
need for continuity (in both the power elite and the wider population) and the 
demands for adjustment to new circumstances (external and internal); 
between a tendency to generational inertia and a desire for renewal; and, 
perhaps most damagingly, between a potentially rigid, exclusive, ageing 
leadership (which still perceived itself partly in terms of the 1950s-60s) and 
the frustrations of a younger, educated Cuba, less amenable to the repetitions 
of older slogans and demanding alternative solutions. 
Such tensions (partly accidental and partly inevitable) were certainly 
exacerbated by the effects of the leadership's recognition of the urgency of 
economic reaction to the crisis. By 1986, and certainly by 1989, that 
leadership was largely convinced of the overriding economic priorities facing 
the Revolution, namely the careful anticipation of crisis management (largely 
through the 'special period in peacetime' prefigured in 199016), long-term 
diversification and long-term efficiency (emphasising enterprise autonomy 
and managerialism). 
In this context five factors conspired to bring these underlying and growing 
tensions to the surface in the form of a now identifiable political crisis. The 
first is, most obviously, the impact of Cuba's dramatic, sudden and deep 
economic, and therefore social, decline. With living standards falling daily, 
with shortages that are unprecedented for most Cubans (including even the 
much vaunted healthcare provision), demoralisation has visibly taken root, 
corroding the hope which played such a vital part in sustaining support 
throughout previous 'dark days'. For the fact is that the 'special period' (as 
the crisis is continually described officially) has had one particularly 
corrosive effect, in undermining the level of political activity. For the 
average Cuban, always highly politicised and often remarkably willing to be 
involved in a range of apparently time-consuming and demanding political 
mobilisations, has ceased to be as actively interested in politics as before the 
crisis; instead, the once committed citizen is more interested in the boring 
and demanding daily task of garnering personal and family supplies from the 
limited range of resources available, or, more corrosively, delving into the 
informal sector and the 'dollar' economy. The result is an evident cynicism, 
a growing disenchantment with the privileges of the leaders, and a visible 
decline in active participation in the mass organisations, especially the 
Comites de Defensa de la Revolution (CDRs) in Havana and the Organos de 
Poder Popular (OPP).17 Too many Cubans have too much to do 'hunting and 
gathering' to be convinced of the need for the usual guardia, or even to be 
convinced that the estado benefactor can ever again be relied upon to meet 
their needs. 
The second, paradoxically, is the impact of the economic changes designed 
to arrest and reverse that decline. For the fundamental shifts already outlined 
clearly run the risk (which Cuban politicians and leaders recognise fearfully) 
of undermining the prevailing ethos of an ideology which has long run deep 
in the Cuban political culture. One example is the new emphasis on profit 
(rather than social need). A further destabilising factor is the effect of the 
reorientation towards tourism, with its predictable spin-off of a satellite 
'black' economy of contraband, petty crime, pilfering and even, most 
demoralisingly, prostitution, which is now operating on an organised basis 
in tourist areas of Havana. These problems were, of course, features of the 
pre-1959 Cuba which the new Revolution so successfully eliminated. 
This in turn has produced the politically astute, but dangerous, 
'dollarisation' reform of July 1993, which, by decriminalising the holding of 
dollars (which can now be exchanged freely for instrumentos de pago at 
preferential rates), has created pockets of privilege among those with access 
to the tourist economy or those involved in the evolving 'underworld'. It is 
a clear case of economic realism (to increase production and formalise a 
growing informal sector) and short-term political pragmatism (to reduce 
stress, not least among the more disgruntled population in and around the 
capital), taking precedence over ideological commitment, and possible long-
term political damage to a culture which has long stressed, and largely 
practised, equality. It has solved one problem, in generating greater 
economic activity and ensuring access to limited supplies, but clearly created 
another. The resulting resentment, among the very sectors most loyal to the 
system, is a growing worry for the leadership; for that resentment is being 
directed not just against the petty 'black-marketeers' and those who frequent 
tourist locales, but also against the visible benefits being enjoyed by those in 
positions of authority in the joint ventures and the autonomous enterprises. 
Corruption is again on the popular agenda - a significant development 
politically. 
Indeed, from the average Cuban citizen's point of view, there is effectively 
a four-sector division of the present Cuban economy. There is first the dollar-
linked economy, until recently thriving, expanding, with few social, 
ideological or, some would say, moral constraints, in which many Havanans, 
for example, lead a relatively comfortable existence. By apparently turning 
a blind eye to this sector, the leadership has run the risk of losing the active 
support of those who are not so fortunate, but has also risked the growth of 
a large sector out of the control of the economic management team but under 
the influence of the currency of the United States. The balance between the 
advantages and the disadvantages of this economy has been a delicate one. 
There is, secondly, the peso economy of Havana, which is denied access 
to basic supplies, such as officially rationed food, supposedly universally 
available medicines, and even, in certain areas, water - these provisions 
being often creamed off illegally by the dollar economy. This, of course, is 
part of the bedrock of the Revolution's political support, more socially 
cohesive than the dollar economy, often employed in the state bureaucracy 
or in state services and, until now, loyal to the system; the fact that such 
people have seen their standards falling because of the unchecked activities 
of those less loyal than themselves has been a cause for concern for the 
leadership and one basic reason for the economic measures announced in May 
1994. 
The third and fourth sectors are found outside Havana and outside the 
tourist enclaves, where dollars, being relatively unavailable, have not yet 
succeeded in undermining the existing systems of distribution, where the 
CDRs operate more effectively and where there is, consequently, a greater 
degree of basic commitment to the political system, as indeed was always the 
case. There is the economy operating in the provincial cities (especially 
Santiago, Cienfuegos and Santa Clara) where there is some evidence not only 
of less inequality but even of small-scale economic growth and where the 
social infrastructure has not yet been as damaged as it has in Havana. Beyond 
that, the fourth sector is the countryside itself, even less assailed by the 
corrosive effect of the dollar and with its infrastructure and support much 
more intact, but also, more recently, with the prospect of economic gain in 
the freeing of the landholding system. 
Another destabilising factor has been the effect of rising expectations. For, 
on at least three occasions, expectations of political reform have been raised, 
especially amongst the younger elements (not least within the clase politico, 
of the Union de Juventud Comunista - the UJC): with the rise of Gorbachev 
and, subsequently, his visit to Cuba (which did indeed coincide with, or lead 
to, a vigorous political and intellectual debate); with the end of the Cold War 
(which, while it raised fears of a rampant, unchecked, United States, also 
raised the prospect of a decline in tension); and, in 1992, with the election of 
Clinton. 
The final factor has been the reality that three and a half decades of 
politicisation (building on the high levels of political activity before 1959) 
have created a population which is well educated, politically articulate, used 
to expressing its opinion and being heard (through the local fora of the 
various mass organisations), well aware and informed of the options available 
elsewhere, and, especially among the young, increasingly distrustful of 
official information (even where patently true). Effectively, a culture of 
confident complaint has been created, to which the system has to respond. 
The combination of these factors has created a political crisis, but less one of 
mass desertion than one of credibility in the face of disappearing benefits and 
an apparent inflexibility. 
How, then, has the Cuban system reacted to this crisis? Examination of 
what has actually happened since 1986 reveals the truth that, contrary to 
external impressions, Cuba has not stood still politically. While the political 
shifts may not have been as dramatic and fundamental, or at least as visible, 
as the economic, there has, on closer examination, been a process of change 
that we could perhaps characterise as not as deep and as fast as many (outside 
and inside Cuba) would prefer, but certainly more significant than is 
immediately obvious. At the more superficial, pragmatic, level, we can easily 
identify a series of reforms, measures and shifts which we may accurately 
describe as cosmetic, but which nonetheless have a significance in sending 
signals, as intended, to both the domestic and the international audience and 
have, also as intended, helped ease some of the growing pressure felt in the 
political arena. Certainly one should not discard 'cosmetic' changes as being 
insignificant within a system which has long been geared to codes, symbols 
and its own 'hyperlanguage' of politics, and where signs can often play a 
real, proactive role. 
One example of this sort of reform has been a noticeable easing of overt 
pressure on known dissidents since early in 1993, the more easily discernible 
after the visible hardening of attitudes during 1991-2, when many activists 
were harrassed, arrested and put under popular pressure. Now, however, 
many of the more prominent among those who suffered have been released, 
allowed to travel abroad (and, more surprisingly, return to Cuba afterwards) 
and even to stand for elections at the municipal level in the February 1993 
elections. 
Similarly, there have been many recent indications of an easing of the 
closed attitude to domestic debate which also characterised the 1991-2 period. 
This new toleration (even of a degree of iconoclasm), echoing the atmosphere 
of 1989-91, may have short-term pragmatic motives (to allow a safety valve 
for a disgruntled population), but it may also, as with the greater toleration 
of dissident activity, reflect some degree of official confidence. 
Four further apparently cosmetic moves (in reality more significant than 
just symbolic), have come in the 1992-4 period. The first was the reform, in 
1992, of the Constitution. While these amendments, as with changes to any 
Constitution whose primary function is to legitimise a system, may simply 
have been a 'rubber-stamping' (by an essentially 'rubber-stamp' parliament) 
of the changes decided by the more powerful Party Congress of 1991, they 
also sent significant signals abroad and at home. The most outstanding of 
these reforms enshrined in the Constitution were: the official toleration of the 
implications of joint ventures (in permission to foreign enterprises to 
repatriate capital and even to own Cuban property); the repeated emphasis on 
a more nationalist definition of the revolutionary ethos; and the opening of 
the Party to religious believers (partly a move to make overtures towards the 
supportive churches and partly a desire to tap the potential skills of hitherto 
ignored groups). 
The second was the creation of the Consejos Populares (piloted in 1991 and 
extended in April 1993) - local committees formed from a mix of elected 
OPP councillors and heads of 'key' local enterprises and services. In a sense 
they have become a species of 'managerialist democracy', relatively 
accountable bodies with special executive powers to identify local problems 
of distribution, production and infrastructure, with some success in short-
cutting bureaucratic bottlenecks, allowing greater flexibility and openness, 
and offering welcome channels of complaint. 
The third change has been the creation of parlamentos obreros, workplace 
assemblies called to discuss economic problems and proposals - a 
development which, so far, seems to have been surprisingly well received, 
given both the level of participation and the degree of acceptance of often 
harsh economic decisions which have then been taken, arising formally out 
of proposals generated in these discussions. Obviously, they serve a valuable 
legitimating function, in involving the average Cuban worker in decisions 
which might, if imposed, be much less tolerable; it becomes perhaps less 
easy to blame an unresponsive government under these circumstances.18 
Finally, in March 1993, came the Ministerial reshuffle which saw Roberto 
Robaina replace Ricardo Alarcon as Foreign Minister, with the latter being 
apparently shunted aside to the post of President of the new National 
Assembly.19 Yet here we have clear evidence of the underlying importance 
of signs and symbols within the Cuban system. For this latter, apparently 
cosmetic, change in fact reflected deeper shifts. Outside observers (and many 
within Cuba) offered a number of initial interpretations of the reshuffle. To 
some, this was an insignificant, superficial, move; to others, it was, if 
anything, a gesture of resistence to change by Castro, given that Robaina, 
still under 40 in 1995 and the rising star of the new generation, had been 
moved to a post which traditionally could be seen as largely bureaucratic with 
little autonomy, and one which removed a potential rival to Castro himself. 
A further interpretation was, however, possible: that the move was a 
promotion of Robaina, a clear negotiating gesture to the United States and a 
legitimation of the National Assembly. It was a promotion of Robaina, first, 
because the post of Foreign Minister had after 1989-1991 acquired a new 
importance, as Cuba's external profile assumed more significance and played 
a greater role in its internal and external redefinition; without the diplomatic 
protection of the former Soviet Union, the Cuban leadership has evidently 
seen the cultivation of a new external profile as vital to its survival, in the 
same way that it had in the early 1960s when the much underrated Raul Roa, 
as Foreign Minister, played a key role in establishing new alliances and in 
redefining both Cuba's external orientation and its internal ethos. Moreover, 
there is little question that, after Clinton's election, the most important 
foreign policy issue has become the establishment of some kind of dialogue 
with Washington; Robaina's appointment again raises the profile of the post 
in that context. 
There is also, however, the Alarcon side to the equation. Certainly, given 
the powerlessness of the old National Assembly (which met briefly twice a 
year to debate, but ultimately approve, the decisions of the Party's Central 
Committee), the post of Assembly President would previously have been seen 
as a demotion for someone of Alarcon's stature; alternatively, it could also 
have been seen as something of a delegitimation of the Assembly itself, now 
put in the hands of someone whose sole political experience had been 30 
years as a career diplomat. Inevitably, however, there was more to the move. 
In the first place, Alarcon was no mere bureaucrat, but a highly capable, 
intelligent and trusted politician, with long tenure in the posts of Deputy 
Foreign Minister and then Foreign Minister; this was especially true of his 
often good relations with foreign policy establishments in many countries 
(often politically unsympathetic or even antagonistic), and even with certain 
emigre political circles in the USA. To put the National Assembly in the 
hands of a politician of his ability, record and loyalty actually had a great 
significance for the Assembly itself;20 for he possesses valuable qualities of 
being seen as a reformer whose handling of issues is sound and of having an 
exceptionally good understanding of the intricacies and imperatives of both 
domestic US politics and the emigre community. Indeed, it was no 
coincidence that in April 1994, he played such a key role in the 'Nation y 
Emigration' conference in Havana, or that the negotiations with Washington 
in September 1994 were led by him. 
The second major change was the reform of the OPP system, which, for 
some two decades, had been a curious mixture of the highly participatory (at 
the local, municipal level) and the highly centralised and executive (at the 
national level), with a mismatch between the legitimacy of the local 
democratic structures and the pointlessness of an Assembly elected only 
indirectly in which Communist cadres dominated. If any part of the political 
structure cried out for reform and opening it was this mismatch. 
This gave an added importance to the planned elections for the National 
Assembly in February 1993, a voting exercise already full of some 
significance given that the reforms begun by the Party Congress of 1991 had 
made this election the first direct elections to the Assembly. Against the 
background of a widescale expression of public disillusion in the municipal 
elections of December 1992,21 the leadership simply could not afford a 
repetition in February. The preparations for the February elections were 
therefore even more meticulous, including (as before the 1991 Congress) a 
wide and often vigorous debate in various fora, from which the underlying 
message from the grass-roots was of the need to offer as much openness and 
as wide a range of candidates as possible. Finally, as the elections 
approached, the leadership gambled on a move which would either be its 
trump card or its undoing - by presenting the vote as a referendum on the 
Revolution itself. 
The results were apparently typical: the entire official 'slate' of 589 
candidates was elected on the first round in a 98.8% turnout, and 70% of 
those elected were Party members: so much, it seemed, for reform and 
openness. However, the reality was actually more complex than the initial 
reactions suggested. 
First, the turnout was up on the 97 % figure for the disheartening December 
voting. True, the increase was minimal and not surprising, given that the 
CDRs were given the clear task of persuading everyone to vote (a job they 
had conspicuously failed to do in December), but with the economic situation 
for most families worsening in the preceding two months, a low turnout 
might reasonably have been expected. Secondly, it was possible to gauge, by 
extrapolating from the figures, the scale of dissatisfaction and opposition: 
given that some 88.4% of voters voted for the 'slate' in its entirety, we can 
perhaps assume - to take a 'worst case scenario' - that the remaining 900,000 
registered a vote of some kind against that list (against all or some); 
furthermore, the 560,000 blank votes (which equalled 7% of the electorate 
but as much as 14% in Havana) must be taken as clear 'opposition' - and to 
this extent the higher turnout can perhaps be explained by those oppositionists 
who did indeed intend to take the chance to cast a vote in what they too saw 
as a referendum; finally, there were the 100,000 who abstained. In all, about 
19% of the electorate failed to vote for the full official list to some extent and 
in some form or other (totalling some 1.5 million Cubans). Interestingly, the 
leading dissident, Elizardo Sanchez, accepted that this sort of percentage was 
probably an accurate reflection of the size of a genuine opposition 
constituency, however defined; if true, then that figure also meant, of course, 
that around 81% of the electorate were prepared, for whatever reason, to 
register some sort of support. Even if we allow for a degree of official 
'exaggeration', these statistics still tell a significant story. 
There were other conclusions to be drawn. For example, 70% of delegates 
elected from the Party's ranks meant an unprecedentedly high figure of 30% 
of the new Assembly as non-Party people, and, perhaps more significant, 
83 % of those elected were total newcomers to the Assembly, indicating both 
a high turnover and the greater likelihood that Party control (which had been 
deliberately downplayed during the selection process) might be weaker over 
so many new, and non-Party, delegates, who might also be, as a result, more 
open to pressure from below rather than above. Indeed, most commentators 
recognised that, in the context of crisis and discontent, and bearing in mind 
the clear message given from the grass-roots before the elections, this new 
Assembly would be expected to respond more immediately and directly to 
constituent pressure than was ever the case before, especially via the six-
monthly Rendition de cuentas meetings. 
Once elected, the new Assembly did in fact begin to acquire something of 
a life of its own. It may or may not be true that it rejected Castro's choice as 
President, but what was clear was that it intended to have a more permanent 
and responsive role. Alarcon, for example, criticised its previous 'rubber-
stamp' existence, and ten Standing Committees were established which would 
be, and have been, in permanent session between meetings of the Assembly, 
systematically consulting Municipal and Provincial Assemblies. There was, 
in fact, little doubt that both leadership and electorate have expected much 
from this new body, the former seeing it as a safety valve and legitimating 
device, as a means of making controlled change, even as becoming the forum 
for debate and change (rather than the Party), the latter seeing it as a means 
of exerting pressure on a leadership which had lost touch. Many expect it to 
be only a matter of time before the Assembly itself reforms its structures to 
become a more permanent and effective parliament - a move to which the 
leadership would not be opposed, at least (under Alarcon's respected but 
reliable tutelage) guaranteeing some degree of management of protest. This 
is the real significance of his appointment as the Assembly President, as a 
legitimate representative of the leadership, with sufficient popular support to 
carry the majority with him; certainly, Alarcon was a much safer choice for 
this task than others might have been.22 
Beyond all this there has been a third area of deep change - in the Party 
itself and in the Government. The process of change began in 1991, with the 
build-up to, and operation of, the Party Congress. Preceded by an extensive, 
and often critical, debate, it resulted in a purge of cadres and in changes at 
the top. Most importantly, it confirmed the end of the old 'guerrilla 
generation', by removing some prominent veterans from the Buro Politico 
(including Raul Castro's wife, Vilma Espin, the long-standing leader of the 
Federation de Mujeres Cubanas). That process has been confirmed further 
by the election of the Consejo de Ministros (the executive committee of the 
National Assembly) in February 1993, which saw over half of the members 
replaced, including Guillermo Garcia (a long survivor from the 1950s Sierra 
Maestra guerrilla foco) and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (the arch-survivor from 
the old PSP). They were replaced by two army generals, one of whom, Sixto 
Batista, is National Coordinator of the CDRs. Finally, in June 1994 the two 
Vice-Presidents of the Consejo, the veterans Ramiro V aides and Joel 
Domenech, were removed.23 
Simultaneously, the removal of the guerrilla generation continued within 
the economic team, with Osmani Cienfuegos (whose replacement of 
Rodriguez in the mid-1980s had signalled the start of a more fidelista 
emphasis and of 'rectification') and Pedro Miret giving way to two rising 
stars of the new generation.24 First, and most importantly, the changes saw 
the nomination of Carlos Lage, often seen as the economic alter ego of 
Robaina; indeed, from that moment, Lage has been described outside Cuba 
as the effective Prime Minister of Cuba, although in 1994 his public profile 
was reduced somewhat, allowing the Finance Minister to take any blame 
attached to unpopular economic measures. The second promotion was that of 
Esteban Lazo, the Afro-Cuban head of the Party in Santiago, almost certainly 
less a recognition of Lazo's abilities or popularity than of the constituency he 
represents, as a possible counterweight to a more disgruntled Havana and 
even as a step in a possible redefinition of the system. 
Finally, in August 1993, came a swathe of important changes, with the 
promotion to various economic ministries of four key reformers: the Party 
boss in Cienfuegos and Buro Politico member, Nelson Torres Perez, as Sugar 
Minister, Alfredo Jordan Morales, as Agriculture Minister (undoubtedly 
given the task both of improving food production and of breaking up the state 
lands); General Silvano Colas Sanchez (Head of the FAR - Armed Forces -
Technical Directorate) as Minister of Communications; and, most 
importantly of all, the naming as Finance Minister of Jose Luis Rodriguez, 
ex-Deputy Head of the Research Centre for the World Economy (CIEM) and 
long known as a pragmatic and highly imaginative thinker. The last is 
probably the key operator within this quartet, with the task of overseeing the 
opening of the currency system and masterminding the reform process. 
As a result of this steady reshuffle, it has become possible to detect a clear 
generational shift, with a coherent group of young reformers on the rise and, 
in the real responsibility being given to them, seen as the successors to the 
now departing 'guerrilla generation'. There is, for example, in addition to 
Lage and Robaina, Abel Prieto, Head of the Writers' Union (UNEAC), and 
as such a key link with intellectual circles; Octavio Castillo, Deputy Head of 
the State Commission for Economic Cooperation; Osvaldo Martinez (Head 
of CIEM and of the National Assembly Standing Commission for the 
Economy). It seems that, at last, the ageing leadership has recognised the 
dangers of the growing generation gap, both within the Party and within Cuba 
generally, and sent out clear signals that a generational renewal is actually 
taking place. On the basis of these real changes, there seems considerable 
evidence of the Cuban system feeling its way cautiously, but at an 
accelerating pace, towards some kind of reformed system. 
One such measure was the 'dollarisation' decree of July 1993, which does 
seem to have had the effect of easing pressure in the informal economy, 
putting more dollars into circulation and more goods on many tables.25 A 
further, highly significant, move (significant for its practical, as well as 
symbolic, implications) was the September 1993 measure allowing private 
enterprise in a range of about 100 petty trades, crafts and services, a decree 
aimed at releasing the economic energies of the growing informal economy, 
but also intended to ease discontent among the working class.26 Equally 
dramatic was the June 1994 agrarian reform (the first since 1963), which 
broke up state lands into small-to-medium staple-food cooperatives (Unidades 
Basicas de Production Agricola - UBPC)27 and will do much to increase 
support, and, it was clearly hoped, domestic food supplies.28 In September 
1994, the long-expected return to the 'free' peasant market of 1981-6 was 
announced.29 
The measures announced between May and September 1994 will 
undoubtedly take this process further, since it is expected that, over a period 
of eighteen months, these will be progressively introduced and intensified in 
order to both formalise and restrict the informal economy, to reduce 
inflationary pressures (via the gradual phasing in of taxes on non-salary 
incomes and profits), to remove subsidies further and, most importantly, to 
move to the internal convertibility of the peso. The gradualness of the 
package is significant, indicating the leadership's determination to control 
some of the dangers of the recent changes. 
In the light of all this, what is the 4new system' towards which Cuba seems 
now to be moving, albeit cautiously? In the first place it is one defined by a 
totally new world context. For one reality of the Cuban Revolution has been 
that the world context, which played such a fundamental part in setting the 
Revolution's agenda in 1959-62, now sets that agenda more rather than less. 
During 1986-91, Cuba was probably at its most isolated, rapidly losing allies 
and seeing once sympathetic leaders distancing themselves from what they 
saw as a dinosaur, with the stigma of the discredited Soviet bloc. Since 1991, 
however, a systematic and clever diplomatic campaign has turned that 
situation around somewhat. Within the region, Cuba is now certainly 
enjoying a much more favourable climate than hitherto. The annual Ibero-
American Summits of 1991-94, which many expected to isolate Cuba (given 
political shifts within Latin American governments), actually proved much 
less critical, with many regional leaders distancing themselves from US 
pressure and setting up the means to cooperate with Cuba to ease it out of 
economic crisis and towards political reform. More specifically, the Mexican 
government, despite its preoccupation with NAFTA and its desire to maintain 
good relations with the United States, resisted US pressure in early 1993 and 
set up joint ventures in textiles, mining, communications and banking. 
Similarly, the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) called, in July 1993, 
for an end to the blockade, agreed a month later to set up a Joint Commission 
with Cuba on economic cooperation and, in July 1994, voted to include Cuba 
in the proposed Association of Caribbean States, against Washington's 
objections. 
Further afield, most Western European governments have not only objected 
to the extra-territorial provisions of the Cuba Democracy Act, but have 
challenged it openly. Spain, after a period of distance, agreed loans in 1993 
of $40 million, in addition to the 52 joint ventures either agreed or already 
operating.30 Finally, Cuba scored three major diplomatic triumphs with the 
successive UN General Assembly votes against the US embargo, in 
November 1992 (by 58 votes to 3, with 71 abstentions), in November 1993 
(by 84 votes to 4) and in October 1994 (by 101 to 2, with 48 abstentions). 
Cuba's links with the countries of the former Soviet Union have not been 
as problematic as expected. Most notably, Russia and Cuba signed a new 
cooperation agreement in May 1993, involving a new oil-sugar 'swap' (of 1.5 
mt of sugar for 3.5 mt of oil), plus deals on tobacco, pharmaceuticals and 
fertilisers.31 Nonetheless, such deals, while in the long-run beneficial to the 
beleagured economy, do not in themselves signify any deep change; Cuba has 
long enjoyed good relations with a range of countries whose political systems 
and alliances might have ordinarily indicated otherwise. Where they are 
significant is in the light they shed on Cuban attitudes and the pressure they 
bring to bear on the main area of foreign policy concern, relations with 
Washington. If, then, the perceived moves towards some sort of detente are 
real, that world context may be creating the required external 'space' for the 
redefinition process. 
Does this 'redefinition' therefore mean a move towards an alternative 
system? Almost certainly, internal or external expectations of such a 
fundamental revolution are unrealistic. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is that, exodus nothwithstanding, there is still no visible evidence of any 
popular, organised discontent (as opposed to reported instances of local 
protest). That is not to say, of course, that it does not exist or is unlikely to 
evolve; it is simply that there are factors in the Cuban system which make 
such a coherent development less likely. For example, there is no organised 
national vehicle for opposition in Cuba - no basis for a Solidarity-style 
movement, no large popular dissident Church - to articulate whatever 
discontent there is. Hence, it may simply be a case of widespread discontent 
still seeking an instrument. Nonetheless, the fact that as yet no organised 
internal movement seems to threaten the stability of the system presumably 
suggests that the system, beleaguered though it is, still enjoys the luxury of 
some time to sort itself out politically as well as economically. 
Secondly, there is no apparent elite cleavage within Cuba, no interest group 
sufficiently organised to mount a challenge to the existing leadership. 
Politicians have been marginalised individually, but the leadership has taken 
care not to marginalise whole groups. The only institution capable of such a 
challenge, and which indeed was once marginalised, is the Armed Forces 
(FAR). 
The Cuban leadership has, since the end of the Angola campaigns and the 
return of the troops, been steadily reducing the size of the armed forces and 
of military expenditure (by over 50% of its 1989 figure). Needless to say, 
this development has been the product of a mix of motives, most notably the 
need for drastic cuts in the state budget, but also the need to send signals to 
Washington that a less military Cuba is willing to make concessions to reduce 
any perceived 'threat' to regional stability. Many observers, however, saw 
the moves as reflecting the need to reduce the potential power base of any 
disgruntled FAR groups. For, in the wake of the high level of autonomy 
which sections of the FAR had begun to develop in, and as a result of, the 
Angola episode (an autonomy which played a part in the rise of the Ochoa-La 
Guardia group in 1989), the leadership could not be unaware of the potential 
for discontent among cadres whose prestige was exceptionally high until 
1989, but who are now perceived as less needed and have a less clear military 
role to play. While there may not be a clear-cut military-civilian cleavage in 
Cuba (thanks to the peculiar nature of the FAR-militia complex and the 
persistence of public attitudes to what has been referred to as the 'civic 
soldier'32) and while there may no clear 'militarist' identity, the potential 
threat from a 'separatist' armed forces (especially one with a powerful 
industrial base, such as the FAR enjoys) cannot be ignored. Indeed, many 
outside commentators attributed just such a motivation to the arrest and 
execution of Ochoa in 1989, seeing it as a severe warning to any potentially 
disgruntled and perhaps overconfident FAR officers that they should not 
overstep the mark. 
Against that background, however, there have been recent indications of 
a return to favour, and a reincorporation, of the FAR. If true, this may be 
simply a reflection of the increasingly important economic role which the 
FAR plays, not least in staple food production (where productivity seems to 
be higher than on cooperatives);33 it must also, though, reflect the dangers 
of a long-term marginalisation of such a powerful force. 
In this respect, the recently higher profile given to Raul Castro, head of the 
FAR, is significant. It was he who, after some months and even years of 
apparently declining political importance, was given the task of announcing 
the liberalisation of the peasant markets in September 1994, the opening up 
of cooperatives and the deregulation of prices. There are several 
interpretations possible: first, that it was a move to deflect some of the media 
attention from an unhelpful Fidel-centric focus; secondly, that it was the 
granting of a voice to the 'old guard' (in which case his clear defence of the 
reform process is perhaps instructive, as though such a voice were needed to 
give a 'historic' imprimatur to ideologically unpalatable reforms, reforms to 
which Fidel himself was perhaps less willing to lend his name). The third 
explanation is that it signalled a recognition of the strength and future 
significance of the FAR in the process of political and economic recovery. 
Beyond these intra-regime perspectives, there are more basic reasons why 
an alternative system is not at this stage a likely, or even desired, outcome 
for many Cubans. The first is the residual, if weakened, loyalty of a 
sufficient number of citizens to a system (and a leadership) which, for all its 
faults, has much still to offer, has firm popular and historical roots (unlike 
many of the pre-1989 Eastern European systems), and which, by allowing 
benefits to be allocated extensively and safety valves to operate, may still 
enjoy majority support. 
Indeed, there seems at present to be a three-way political division of the 
Cuban population. About a third of that population can be judged as, one way 
or another, opposed to the present system in any form, either through 
ideological objections, emigre connections or simply personal experiences. 
That figure is based partly on extensive impressions but also on the 1993 
voting figures, enhanced by a further year of problems, corrosion and 
outright discontent, especially in the 20-35 age group. Alongside that is 
another third perhaps, who are wholly committed to the system, whatever its 
visible faults or its patent effects on them personally. These are especially 
most Party activists, the older generation (who remember the sacrifices and 
who personally experienced the social changes), those over 35 and the rural 
population. 
It is the remaining third that is, however, most significant, the less 
committed but still loyal section. These are typically Cubans who have 
suffered throughout the 'special period', whose patience has been sorely 
tested, whose regular involvement and participation in the various 
mechanisms of the political structure has declined in the face of the task of 
daily survival, but whose fears are at present greater than their discontent and 
in whom a residual loyalty, or trust, is still evident. Those fears focus 
patently on two possible outcomes. The first is a genuine fear, reinforced by 
press coverage of post-1989 Europe, that Cuba will be pushed into a process 
of economic change on the Eastern European model, with the inevitable price 
of mass unemployment and the dismantling of systems of social provision. 
The average Cuban's reliance on the universal free health service is a factor 
not to be underestimated. The second fear refers to a future in which the 
exiles return to 'claim their own' and come to dominate an unchecked 
market-led economic recovery. For this third, therefore, there is still a level 
of tolerance, a passive willingness to sit out the crisis (which is often 
optimistically referred to as a period being 'passed through') and a reluctance 
to contemplate a real alternative. There is also a residual hope that the state 
can continue to protect as it has and to guarantee minimum standards. 
The second critical factor is the essential flexiblity of a political system, 
which has consistently shown an ability to react pragmatically to successive 
crises (though none as deep as this). The breadth of the discourse of the 
Cuban revolutionary political culture allows it the clear possibility of shifting 
easily without 'betrayal' or confusion. Moreover, just as the system proved 
capable of developing first the CDRs in the 1960s, then the Rendition de 
cuentas in the 1970s, and now, in the 1990s, a more responsive National 
Assembly and the parlamentos obreros, the Revolution's ability to be 
flexibile is still obviously strong. 
If, then, the system is not likely to move, voluntarily or by force, towards 
a totally new system, what future direction is likely to be followed? What are 
the alternative scenarios, or even the possible outcomes of a likely process 
of political reform, assuming that the system's economic survival guarantees 
sufficient time and space for such reform? Most (apart from a few emigres) 
would rule out any sort of rapid move to a multi-party democracy: that is 
clearly not only perceived as too dangerous (by the leadership), but also as 
irrelevant, given the evident lack of a base for significant alternative parties 
(the organised opposition having steadily decamped to Miami over the 
decades), and, above all, the lack of a coherent, consensual opposition 
project. The dissident groups may be many and vociferous, but they probably 
represent few Cubans actively and remain small and divided; the exile 
community, on the other hand, seems still to enjoy no great legitimacy within 
Cuba, even among the most disillusioned. What, however, is not only likely 
but even already evident is a shift towards a sort of internal pluralism, the 
development of a kind of 'government of national unity', a 'broad front' both 
to open up (in a controlled fashion) and to broaden legitimacy. 
Such a 'front ' would necessarily have to have as its base the Party, but 
what kind of Party would this be, and is it already happening? Ever since 
1989, a discernible trend has been under way to redefine the Party in more 
nationalist, cubanista, terms,34 emphasising its and the Revolution's 
historical roots and Cuban character. Given the evident need for a more 
responsive structure to reclaim lost legitimacy and broaden its appeal (since 
there seems to be unprecedentedly widespread cynicism about the Party), it 
is by no means out of the question that the Party may soon cease to be as 
selective as it has been and may even rename itself. Such a party, in alliance 
with some or all of those above forces, could indeed offer some prospect of 
a different approach, while still keeping faith with its roots - perhaps 
redefining 'Communism' as some sort of 'communalism', or, more likely, 
'communitarianism' (to allow for the detente, and possible alliance, with 
religious groups). In this respect, the model of the Mexican Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has its attractions, namely of a 
'hegemonic' party within a 'corporate' political structure. 
With which forces or groups, then, would the Party ally itself in this way? 
The first candidate is the definable 'Christian Democrat' or 'Social Christian' 
constituency in Cuba, in the form of the variously sympathetic, but often 
critical, Protestant Churches, which in October 1993 distanced themselves 
from the more hardline stance adopted by the Catholic Church.35 Certainly 
there is ample evidence of an entente between the Revolution and these 
organisations, which have long given support to the Revolution's social 
policies and which now fiercely condemn the embargo. There seems less 
possibility of the inclusion of the Catholic Church in such an alliance, but a 
history of pragmatism on both sides leads one to surmise that the mutual 
advantages of inclusion rather than exclusion may well overcome such 
problems. Certainly, the advantages to the Cuban leadership, in terms of 
widening active support, gaining legitimacy and even aiding the process of 
ideological redefinition are considerable. 
The second, third and fourth candidates - namely the FAR, the CDRs and 
the Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) - may seem to make the concept 
of a 'broad front' a misnomer, since these three bodies have not obviously 
been autonomous actors, being closely linked to the Party itself. However, 
that assumes the continuation of those links and of the Party in their present 
form. The FAR, for example, would regain some lost credibility and 
potential disillusionment might be diverted by greater visible access to 
decision-making, while the Party would send a message to possible dissidents 
that hopes for a military removal of Castro are unrealistic, and that those who 
contemplate any such removal for themselves would have the military to face 
as well. Moreover, given the military's economic muscle and their potential 
role in recovery, their inclusion in a more formal way would offer much. 
Recent evidence certainly supports this idea. 
Equally, to treat the CDRs as separate might offer the possiblity for those 
who reject the Party as a forum and a channel to see a nationally coordinated 
CDR movement as a viable, or at least non-Party, alternative, perhaps akin 
to some of the more visible new social movements of Latin America, with 
greater informality, flexibility, responsiveness and participation. Certainly, 
the attempt to raise the profile of the CDRs indicates some sort of enhanced 
role, perhaps nationally, although the decline in public legitimacy of these 
bodies in Havana may prevent that from being universally effective. 
The third force - the CTC - is, on the face of it, extremely unlikely, given 
its record since the early 1960s of subordination to leadership and Party and 
its long-standing function as 'transmission-belts' for leadership decisions and 
means of mobilisation.36 However, there are clear signs that the CTC has 
been given its head by a leadership anxious for more safety valves and keen 
to develop as many safe channels of communication as possible. Certainly 
that would explain the apparent rise of Pedro Ross Leal, the head of the CTC, 
less on account of his own abilities than for his power base, but also the 
increasingly critical tone adopted by the newspaper Trabajadores, which 
seems to have been given the role of social conscience, commenting on the 
various economic reforms and thus ensuring a level of leadership awareness 
of the possible political consequences of the social costs of the reform 
programme. This scenario would also be reinforced by the apparent success 
of the parlamentos obreros as consultative and legitimating fora. 
There is also one further possible candidate - the exile community, or part 
of it. Already, in 1993-4, moves were made by the Cubans to facilitate links: 
increased visas (to 500 per week), with no currency limit and no obligatory 
exchange amount or rate, but also with conciliatory noises being made in 
public by certain leaders. In this context the anger of many emigres to the 
Clinton measures in summer 1994 was understandable. On the political side, 
hints were first dropped in 1993 (by Alarcon) of the desirability of Havana 
treating its 'lost children' less as a threat and more as part of a cooperative 
'family', in some sort of formal way. Given Alarcon's record, his undoubted 
importance and the role planned for the new National Assembly, the 
possibility of the vote being extended to certain emigres (under strict 
conditions) is not out of the question, with a resulting 'cooptation' of certain 
more cooperative leaders. Such a move would clearly do much to broaden the 
legitimacy of the process and weaken any political pull of the exiles (and even 
any influence they might still enjoy with Washington). The April 1994 
conference reinforced that likelihood, with its message of unity and 'Nation' , 
its reiteration of nationalist codes and its visible success in undermining the 
emigre political forces. Moreover, Robaina's meeting in Madrid, in 
September 1994, with the leaders of three more dialoguista emigre groups 
confirms this scenario.37 
If any or all of these possibilities emerge, then there is an even greater 
likelihood of the 'impossible' happening, namely the withdrawal from active 
leadership of Castro himself, a possibility not allowed by the continuation of 
the crisis in its present form. One expects his finely attuned survival instincts 
and ability to put his finger on the pulse to make him aware of the need to be 
seen to be stepping down at some time. The likelihood, therefore, of some 
sort of collective leadership is greater now than at any previous moment, with 
Castro in some sort of figurehead role, as President, defining the process 
both externally and internally, and with Robaina, Lage and Alarcon taking 
the key roles of political and economic management. Indeed, such a 
collective leadership probably already exists, but clearly needs to be 
formalised. 
Here, however, there is a contradiction. Fidel Castro still remains central 
to two opposite outcomes. On the one hand, he is vital to legitimacy, 
especially among those who have lived through difficult times, those who 
have benefited most and those who do not perhaps dissent so clearly. On the 
other hand, he is equally central to the hopes of real change, by his removal 
from power. Indeed, to complicate matters further, many also see him as the 
sole guarantor of a real change which would still provide both social peace 
and official support. The conundrum is that the longer he remains, the more 
one section of the population sees him as the guarantee of continuity and 
stability, but the more others (especially the young) see no chance of basic 
change. For one group Fidel remains the solution; for the other he is 
increasingly the problem. 
Conclusion 
All of this leaves the Cuban political system in a delicately balanced 
situation, in which certain factors will be decisive. The first must be the 
question of economic recovery (regardless of reform). Here the signs are 
mixed; at one level the prospects look good. Rises in the price of sugar 
(partly offsetting the disastrous harvests) and nickel eased some of the 
pressure, and domestic production has increased in several areas, notably in 
nickel and oil (the latter from 550,000 tonnes in 1991 to 1.2 mt in 1994). Oil 
deliveries (down from 13 mt to 6 mt at one stage) have picked up again, aided 
by a 1993 Venezuelan-Russian oil swap of 2 mt). Inward investment is 
clearly still inadequate, but it is rising and the steady increase in joint 
ventures augurs well, aided by the fact that over 500 state enterprises in 
external trade are now self-financing. Above all, tourism is booming, rising 
by some 30% per annum and earning $380m in 1992, generating 59,000 
much needed jobs (with average monthly pay in the tourist sector, in 1993-4, 
of 375 pesos, compared to the national average of 200). 
It is, however, at the family level that economic indicators should be. 
examined for their impact on political support and the political future. Here 
the consensus seems to be that shortages have stabilised somewhat, especially 
after the September 1994 reforms and greater liberalisation, and health levels 
(which underwent a serious and worrying decline in 1993) seem to have 
stopped falling. In this respect the political significance of the elimination of 
the neuritis epidemic is not to be underestimated. As a result, there are more 
economic analysts, even outside Cuba, who predict for 1994-5 some levelling 
off in the precipitate fall in activity and living standards. For a delicately 
balanced political structure, that fact, if true, cannot have come a moment too 
soon. Indeed, the possibility exists that 1994 may already be too late, with 
too much fundamental political damage already caused. 
A second key must be the political skills of Fidel Castro himself, who has 
so often been able to make capital from gross errors and calamities, who has 
often in a sense led the opposition (by attributing blame to others and 
articulating popular demands for change), and whose record for survival is 
second to none. He may be the last to admit the need for change (as the 
evidence seemed to suggest during 1989-91), but he is more than capable of 
being the first to instigate it once its need is realised. 
The third factor is the corrosive effect of the process of rapid economic 
liberalisation, offering new values and undermining so many of the old ones 
which have remained in force for three decades, especially the sense of 
'community'. Indeed, one might argue that a widespread and deep sense of 
communally shared values has lain at the heart of the Revolution's survival 
during the crisis years. In a sense, 'citizenship' has been the system's saving 
grace. But how long can that sense withstand the atomising and 
disaggregating pressure of a capitalist ethos, with competition, profit and 
personal gain in the ascendancy, generating the inevitable inequality? One 
irony of the present situation is that the sector most loyal to the Revolution 
(the FAR) is the one without extensive access to the dollar economy, but the 
one whose loyalty was undoubtedly in the minds of those who dictated the 
May 1994 measures; however, many of those who currently clearly benefit 
from the 'dollarisation' may actually prefer the present situation to continue, 
since a full opening might be less amenable than a limited freedom which 
suits them personally. 
On the more obviously political front, much depends on the perceived 
responsiveness, efficacy and willingness to reform itself of the National 
Assembly (for which the signs are so far promising) and the openness of the 
grass-roots and intellectual debate being encouraged again, in which the 
existing, and always useful, Rendition de cuentas system and the CDRs 
(under the newly powerful Sixto Batista) will play a vital role. Indeed, it is 
precisely in this area that the stability of the system will stand or fall. 
Equally, the impact on popular support of the evident moves to rejuvenate the 
Party structures and leadership cannot yet be judged, but will be critical. 
Certainly, in the past, the Cuban leadership has been seen to step back 
from expected changes and to be reluctant to shift ground. That reluctance is, 
of course, predictable, and arises from a variety of motives. In the first 
place, old habits die hard, not least among a tightly knit group of ex-
guerrillas who have seen three and a half decades of 'success' crafted and led 
by them (against all manner of threats, pressure and conspiracy, external and 
internal) and who naturally distrust any move to undermine that achievement. 
There has also been, from 1991, an inevitable fear of the 'Gorbachev factor', 
of opening the floodgates to demands incapable of being met within a limited 
system. There is, furthermore, a deeply entrenched fear of any move which 
might weaken the front against a 'US imperialism' whose whole policy has 
been since 1961 to undermine the Revolution in some way or other. One 
should not underestimate, either, the perception - or, indeed, one might 
accurately say, the recognition - that the need for political change in Cuba is 
simply not as urgent as it had been in Eastern European systems that lacked 
legitimacy as far as the majority of their citizens were concerned and which 
lacked the 'safety valves' available to the Cuban population - systems which, 
in other words, lacked 'citizenship'. 
This brings us back to the original focus. For a twist of fate has meant that 
the Revolution's future in some definable form still depends on decisions 
made in Washington. The ending (or easing) of the embargo will undoubtedly 
make many of the reforms and measures take effect, and would bring a much 
needed element of hope to the beleaguered population. One should not rule 
out the possibility of new initiatives from a Clinton administration which is 
clearly keen for foreign policy success (especially as it is the one area where 
the President still has freedom to act, in the face of a Republican-dominated 
Congress) and which has already been sufficiently alarmed by the ripple 
effects of turbulence and hardship in Cuba. 
All of which makes an unusual outcome in Cuba likely, but not perhaps the 
one predicted by so many since 1989 (indeed, in some cases, since 1959) -
namely the total collapse of the Revolution. The possibility seems greater 
now than five years ago that the system may not only survive, but even 
reform itself. Indeed, we may just see the re-emergence of the version of 
revolution planned and hoped for between 1959 and 1961, before the 
blockade and the Cold War combined to distort it. If the balsero exodus had 
any significance, this may be it. 
Notes 
1. By June 1994, the numbers of balseros (raft people) had reached 3,335 
(compared to 2,257 in the whole of 1992 and 3541 in 1993); by 20 August, this 
had reached 8,116 (with 1,189 leaving on that day alone). Finally, once official 
toleration became clear, about 32,000 were recorded as reaching either Florida 
or Guantanamo. 
2. The whole crisis began with the occupation of the Belgian Embassy on 28 
May by 114 asylum seekers, followed by similar occupations of the Chilean and 
German Embassies. In July and August there were a number of hijackings of 
harbour craft and, finally, violent incidents in which two policemen were killed. 
3. Only in 1993 did the first major sociological studies of the Mariel exodus of 
1980 begin to emerge, often with surprising findings, which lends a necessary 
note of caution to any rush to judgement on the most recent exodus. 
4. Cuba Business (London), vol. 8, no. 6, July/August 1994, cited the cost of 
some balsas as $1000 (p. 1). 
5. In May 1994 the National Assembly gave the government powers to 
introduce taxes on the self-employed, cooperatives and private farmers, to cut 
subsidies to unprofitable state enterprises, to raise prices of services and goods 
(including food and medicines), to exchange bank deposits for government 
bonds, and (in a move towards the eventual convertibility of the peso) to control 
the circulation of currency. As a result, in June there were massive price rises 
- cigarettes (566%), petrol (270%), electricity (122%), beer (100%), transport, 
water, postal rates and telephones. There was also a 100% increase in taxation 
on the self-employed - whose numbers may now reach 25-50% of the 
workforce (Cuba Business, vol. 8, no. 8, October 1994, p. l ) - and cuts in 
subsidies to cafeterias. Similarly, the August Assembly approved the 
introduction, in January 1995, of taxes on public services, property, transport, 
and toll charges. 
6. Radio Marti and TV Marti were set up under the Reagan administration as 
part of the campaign to isolate Cuba in the hemisphere and as a concession to 
the right-wing exile lobby. The CDA was the result of the bill by Florida 
Senator Torricelli to tighten the economic pressure on the Cuban government 
in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although it was opposed by 
many Democrats and foreign governments, it played an important role in the 
1992 presidential campaigns and in the search for votes in Florida. 
7. The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) is the largest political 
grouping amongst the emigres; led by Jorge Mas Canosa and closely linked to 
Republican policymakers, it has long been the most intransigent of the exile 
groups, but also the one with the highest political and media profile. 
8. Clinton's initial nomination was Mario Baeza, an Afro-Cuban emigre known 
to favour dialogue, who was opposed fiercely by the CANF. Their own choice 
was, however, overruled and Clinton ended by appointing Alex Watson, a non-
political career diplomat. 
9. Thanks to the mediation of ex-President Carter, the two sides began 
discussions which produced the agreement of 9 September. This allowed for the 
granting of visas to 20,000 Cubans annually (this being the number of balseros 
picked up by the US coastguard after 19 August), plus visas for all those on the 
US Interest Section's waiting list (estimated to be about 6,000). In return, the 
Cubans agreed to take measures to stop the exodus with effect from 13 
September, a delay which increased the number of refugees still further. 
10. Estimates vary considerably of the cost of the embargo to the Cuban 
economy. One frequently cited figure puts it at a total of $38 billion between 
1960 and 1990. In a letter to the UN General Assembly in October 1994, 
Foreign Minister Robaina gave a figure of $970 million for 1993 alone. 
11. As a result of the CDA, the embargo now includes a ban on imports to the 
USA with any Cuban component or on exports to Cuba of any product with 
over 20% of US input, a ban on US bank holdings of Cuban money and on 
ships docking in US ports for six months after calling in Cuban ports. 
12. In 1993 a mysterious eye disease epidemic hit Cuba, affecting thousands of 
Cubans. Many experts attributed it to malnutrition, but cures eluded the health 
system for some time. Eventually, however, a well organised campaign did 
succeed in stopping the epidemic. 
13. It can be described as a 'mixed' model overall, given the definitions offered 
by the economic team now managing the changes. For the current intention 
seems to be the creation of an economy with three sectors. The first is a state 
sector which - albeit at a necessarily reduced level - is a guarantee of the 
continuing provision of what are still seen as 'social' services, and also a 
guarantee of the continuation of a 'socialist' character to the whole model. The 
second is an increasingly self-financing sector of productive enterprises, of 
varying sizes. The third sector covers the burgeoning range of enterprises which 
are patently pushing back the frontiers of the permissable at an increasing rate, 
namely the Joint Venture Agreements (JVA), the autonomous state enterprises 
and ever larger-scale private activities. 
14. The various Party organisations of the Revolution in the 1959-65 period 
reflected the shifting ideological and political process. Between 1959 and 1961 
there were two leading political groups (all others having collapsed): Castro's 
July 26 Movement (including the ex-guerrilla Ejercito Rebelde) and the pre-
1959 Communist Party, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), which joined the 
rebellion in 1958. The increasingly close alliance between these groups led, in 
1961, to the nomination of a leading PSP activist, Anibal Escalante, as the 
person responsible for coordinating them, and a third group, the Directorio 
Revolucionario Estudiantil, into one umbrella grouping, the Organizations 
Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI). In March 1962, however, he was removed, 
and several ex-PSP cadres were purged, as the ORI turned out to be a largely 
PSP-led body; in its place, a largely paper party, the Partido Unificado de la 
Revolution Socialista (PURS) was set up. Finally, in 1965, the Partido 
Comunista Cubano was created - but with only some 50,000 members and with 
no Party Congress until 1975 it remained little more than a vehicle for the ex-
guerrillas who constituted the majority of the leadership. 
15. In July 1989, General Ochoa, Cuban Commander-in-Chief in Ethiopia 
(1977-78) and then Angola (1987-88), and one of only five 'Heroes of the 
Republic', was arrested and charged with treason and corruption (accepting $3.5 
million from the Medellin drugs cartel to allow transshipment of drugs through 
Cuban airspace). He was eventually tried with 13 other high-ranking officers, 
sentenced to death and executed. The fall-out included the arrest, trial and 
sentencing of the Interior Minister and his deputy and a wave of sackings in the 
FAR and the Ministry, all linked to the long-standing 'sanctions-busting' 
operation. 
16. The 'Special Period' was instituted in the early 1990s as a response to 
impending crisis, focusing on self-sufficiency and survival. It tended to overtake 
the post-1986 process of 'rectification' which had characterised Cuban economic 
policy until the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and which involved a fundamental 
rethink of economic orthodoxies. 
17. The CDRs were set up in 1960, as 'vigilante' bodies at street and village 
level and as part of the preparations for the coming US-backed invasion. After 
their success in April 1961 (the Bay of Pigs) they tended to take on a more 
positive socialisation role, involving over 6 million Cubans, and became a 
valuable mechanism of the revolutionary process. The Organos de Poder 
Popular (OPP) were set up in 1976, in a Soviet-style pyramid structure, with 
municipal assemblies being elected directly for 30 month-periods, and provincial 
and national assemblies being elected by these local bodies. 
18. The unions were given a critical role in the May 1994 measures, with 
approximately 80,000 parlamentos discussing the proposals; as a result, the 
CTC put the proposals to the National Assembly for May. 
19. Robaina was long seen as the popular and charismatic head of both the 
Federation de Estudiantes Universitarios (FEU) and the UJC. His promotion 
to the Central Committee in 1990 and to the Buro Politico in 1991 were widely 
seen as signs of a political shift. 
20. According to some commentators, Alarcon actually beat Castro's appointee 
to the post, in something of a gesture of Assembly autonomy; there is no clear 
evidence of this, however. 
21. In December 1992, with the economic crisis apparently deepening and 
discontent increasing, municipal elections were held throughout Cuba, being 
seen by many as a critical indicator of popularity. The resulting message was 
all too clear: about 30% effectively abstained (by spoiling ballots or actually not 
voting), with especially high figures in Havana and even the usually loyal 
Santiago, and a very high proportion of the candidates had to go to a second 
round of voting, having received insufficient votes (under 50%). Given the 
usually high turnout for such elections and the local pressure to participate, such 
figures were indeed significant - and were seen as such by a leadership startled, 
but perhaps not surprised, by this display of protest. 
22. One such aspirant might have been the outspoken leading reformist Carlos 
Aldana who, after a meteoric rise in the early 1990s was suddenly demoted in 
autumn 1992, ostensibly for corruption. Observers suggest that he may have 
overstepped the mark in terms of permissible declarations. 
23. Ramiro Valdes was one of the original activists from 1953 and always part 
of the 'inner circle' of the Revolution, particularly as Minister of the Interior. 
However, from the early 1980s he was progressively demoted, perhaps as part 
of some internal struggle (he had tended to become identified less with the 
Sierra veterans and more with Moscow). 
24. Osmani Cienfuegos, however, returned to favour in 1994 with his 
nomination as Minister of Tourism; if there was any significance in this, it may 
have been a move to place such an ethically delicate development in the hands 
of a trusted guerrilla veteran. 
25. Certainly, that move, in conjunction with the May 1994 measures, has 
dramatically reduced the black market price of the dollar, which fell from an 
average of 120 pesos in May 1994 to 25 in November 1994. 
26. The measure was clearly aimed at small, family-based, enterprises among 
that sector since graduates, who were still guaranteed jobs, were specifically 
excluded from the decree. Even this exclusion was subsequently removed. 
27. The new UBPCs (2,600 by June 1994) accounted for 36% of non-cane 
cultivation, but including 62% of previously state land for vegetable cultivation. 
One feature of these new units was the explicit lifetime rights conceded. 
28. Cuba Business, vol. 8, no. 8, October 1994, p. 1. 
29. The limited mercado libre, set up in 1981, proved an immediate success; 
in one year, 84% of domestically consumed food was produced by the system. 
Politically, however, it proved dangerous, giving rise to considerable resentment 
at the rising prosperity of certain farmers. Gradually, it was cut back by the 
introduction of a state-regulated 'parallel market' and finally, it was abolished 
as part of the 'rectification' drive in 1986. 
30. By Spring 1994, Spanish companies numbered 78 out of the 352 foreign 
companies operating in Cuba, by far the largest contingent. In February 1994, 
Cuba and Spain reached a settlement in the long-standing dispute on 
compensation for expropriated property. 
31. Russian-Cuban relations have not, however, been without their difficulties, 
as witnessed by the brief suspension of Russian oil deliveries in November 
1994, ostensibly responding to the shortfall in Cuban sugar. 
32. Jorge Dominguez in particular has used this term (Cuba: Order and 
Revolution, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1978, p. 341 and passim). 
33. FAR agricultural production (mostly through the Ejercito de Juyentud 
Trabajadora) achieved a 30% increase in 1992 and again in 1993. Cuba 
Business, vol. 8, no. 7, September 1994, p. 4). 
34. For a fuller discussion of cubanismo see the author's 'Marti, Marxism and 
Morality: the Evolution of an Ideology of Revolution', in Richard Gillespie 
(ed.), Cuba after Thirty Years: Rectification and the Revolution (London, 1990, 
pp. 161-83). 
35. For a fuller explanation of the evolving position of the Catholic Church, see 
John Kirk, Between God and the Party. Religion and Politics in Revolutionary 
Cuba (Tampa, 1989). In September 1993, the hierarchy, responding to pressure 
either from certain laity or from the Vatican, or believing the end of the system 
to be nigh, suddenly broke with its policy of cautious entente and produced a 
highly critical statement, to which the government responded angrily. 
36. Many authors have seen the role of unions in socialist Cuba as problematic, 
and have tended to agree with their characterisation as 'transmission belts' for 
executing Party policies. 
37. During Robaina's visit to Spain, he met in particular Eloy Gutierrez 
Menoyo (of Cambio Cubano), Ramon Cernuda (of the Comite pro Derechos 
Humanos y Reconciliation National) and Alfredo Duran (of the Comite Cubano 
para la Democracia). 

